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Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court developed special rules to
govern standing in Establishment Clause cases. In Flast v. Cohen, the
Court held that federal taxpayers have standing to challenge laws that au-
thorize government spending in aid of religion.' The Court acknowledged
that taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause was an exception to
the general rule, first adopted in Frothingham v. Mellon, which denies tax-
payers standing in federal courts to attack spending measures. 2 The Court
reasoned that establishment claims are different because the Establishment
Clause was intended to operate as a specific limitation on federal taxing
and spending power, and further because taxation in any amount, however
small, for the purpose of funding unconstitutional religious spending
worked constitutionally cognizable psychic harm.
From the late 1960s to the Court's 2007 decision in Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc.,3 Flast's taxpayer standing rule seemed to
be settled law. The decision in Flast produced only a single dissenting
opinion,4 and even that opinion acknowledged that allowing standing for
taxpayers under the Establishment Clause would not violate Article 111.5
* Charles Klein Professor of Law & Government, Temple University, James E. Beasley School
of Law. I wish to thank Dean JoAnne Epps and Temple University Beasley School of Law for generous
research support for this article. Also thanks to Professor Bruce Ledewitz for organizing this Symposi-
um, and to Dean Ken Gormley and the Duquesne University School of Law for sponsoring a live
version of it. My thanks go out to my other co-presenters and authors-Richard Albert, Zachary Calo,
Bruce Ledewitz, Samuel Levine, and Christopher Lund-whose many valuable insights informed and
inspired my work. Finally, I wish to thank Chicago-Kent College of Law and its Law Review for
making this Symposium possible, and the staff of the Law Review for providing outstanding editorial
assistance.
1. 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
2. 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). This case is reported as Massachusetts v. Mellon.
3. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
4. See 392 U.S. at 116-33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Justice Harlan acknowledged that standing would have been appropriate if it had been author-
ized by Congress. Id. at 131-33. Obviously, congressional authorization would have made no difference
if the taxpayer standing Congress authorized violated Article 111.
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Although Flast generated some critical scholarly commentary, 6 the deci-
sion occasioned no serious public outcry. In an era famous for its contro-
versial Supreme Court decisions, Flast was not among them.
In the decades following Flast, the federal courts routinely accepted
jurisdiction in many establishment cases based on taxpayer standing with-
out much comment on questions of jurisdiction. To the courts, as to the
public at large, the taxpayer standing rule for establishment claims became
thoroughly domesticated. While some of the cases brought under Flast
provoked vigorous debate on the merits, neither the Justices nor those who
commented on their decisions treated the Court's acceptance of jurisdiction
as an abuse of judicial power. To the contrary, the Court's nuanced adjudi-
cation made it clear that, in practice, only through judicial review could the
sometimes subtle distinctions between permissible and impermissible
forms of government spending be adequately articulated and developed.
While some Justices and many critics vigorously protested the answers the
Court gave on the merits, none doubted its authority to give them.
The Court did refuse jurisdiction in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, but it did so on the
ground that Flast should not be extended past taxing and spending to suits
challenging the federal government's exercise of its Property Clause pow-
ers to dispose of government property.7 The Court shortly thereafter reaf-
firmed taxpayer standing in Bowen v. Kendrick, a decision based on
taxpayer standing that upheld a family planning spending program that
included religiously affiliated grantees. 8 Over the years, taxpayer standing
has supplied jurisdiction in some of the Court's leading establishment cas-
es, including decisions that have both upheld and overturned government
spending measures.
6. Commentators sometimes criticized the Court's test or argued that it should have gone further
in allowing taxpayer suits, but most generally approved the Court's decision to permit taxpayer suits in
Establishment Clause spending cases. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 631-36 (1968); Richard G. Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court
Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229, 274-83 (1969). See generally John M. Alexander, Recent Decisions:
United States-Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers-Federal Standing, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 439
(1969); Rose M. Higby, Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law-Federal Taxpayer's Standing to Chal-
lenge Constitutionality of Federal Statutes, 17 J. PUB. L. 419 (1968); Robert L. Kahan, Federal Tax-
payers and Standing: Flast v. Cohen, 16 UCLA L. REV. 444 (1969); Alan Karabus, The Flast Decision
on Standing of Federal Taxpayers to Challenge Governmental Action: Mirage or Breach in the Dike,
45 N.D. L. REV. 353 (1969); Lawrence D. Stuart, Jr., Standing to Contest Federal Appropriations: The
Supreme Court's New Requirements, 22 Sw. L.J. 612 (1968); Arnold M. Young, The Standing of a
Federal Taxpayer to Challenge the Constitutionality ofFederal Spending, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 351 (1969).
7. 454 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1982).
8. 487 U.S. 589, 618-20 (1988).
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Since the decision in Hein, however, it has been relatively clear that
the Court's establishment standing tables are in the process of being turned.
Hein refused jurisdiction in a case challenging the constitutionality of the
George W. Bush administration's handling of its "faith-based" spending
initiatives. The Court held that the taxpayer plaintiffs lacked standing. Jus-
tice Alito's plurality opinion purported to accept Flast, but in the manner of
Valley Forge it refused to "extend" taxpayer standing to cases that object-
ed, not to actual appropriations by the legislature, but to executive imple-
mentation of the spending program.9 Two Justices-Scalia and Thomas-
concurred separately in an opinion that specifically called for Flast to be
overruled.' 0 Led by Justice Souter, the four dissenters observed that it was
hardly an "extension" of Flast to apply it to matters of spending-measure
implementation, because it is almost always the implementation of an ap-
propriation that makes the appropriation unconstitutional. The dissenters
argued that, from the vantage of standing, there was really no difference
between the situation of the challengers in Hein and those in Bowen. 11
The Hein decision provoked some commentators (myself included) to
speculate that Flast 's days were likely numbered, and that it would be only
a matter of time before the Scalia-Thomas position garnered a majority.12
Those days may be even fewer than we thought, because in its most recent-
ly completed term, the Supreme Court denied taxpayer standing again in
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.13
In Arizona Christian, the Court concluded that Arizona taxpayers have
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state system of tax credits
that channels funds to private (and typically religiously affiliated) schools.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion treated taxpayer standing in Establish-
ment Clause cases as just another variant of the kind of constitutional at-
9. Hein, 551 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 641-42 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. See Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based
Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1009, 1046 (2011). See also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a
Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 115, 132 (2008) (arguing that Hein further restricts Flast to situations
where "the challenged expenditure must: (1) be made under an express legislative mandate, which (2)
includes a specific appropriation, that (3) the enacting legislature understood at the time would benefit
religious entities."); Douglas W. Kmiec, Standing Still-Did the Roberts Court Narrow, but Not Over-
rule, Flast to Allow Time to Re-think Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 514
(2008) (asserting imminence of Flast's demise: "So again, why not toss Flast now? Because, as Mother
used to say, 'The soup is not ready yet'. . . . The primary benefit of the modest decision in Hein is that it
gives the Roberts Court an opportunity to re-think the underlying religion-clause jurisprudence more
carefully.").
13. 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
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tack on spending that Frothingham meant to preclude.14 His opinion devel-
oped at some length the abstract dangers posed by taxpayer standing to the
proper Article III boundaries of the federal courts. In the name of protect-
ing the separation of powers, he refused once again to "extend" Flast-in
this case from spending measures to measures giving tax breaks.15 But he
offered little reason to view tax relief measures differently from spending
measures, 16 and most of what he said against standing would apply with
equal force had the suit had been brought against a state appropriation ra-
ther than a tax credit.
Pressed to do so by Justice Kagan's forceful dissent,17 Justice Kenne-
dy acknowledged that the Court had previously accepted jurisdiction in
several taxpayer establishment challenges to a variety of tax benefits.' 8 The
decisions include some of the leading establishment cases of their day, such
as Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New Yorkl 9 and Mueller v. Al-
len.20 Rather than distinguish those decisions, the best Kennedy could tep-
idly claim was that the Court had not actually decided the jurisdictional
question in those cases, so that the fundamental jurisdictional defects
somehow must have escaped the attention of all the Justices then serving
on the Court (including, in some instances, Justice Kennedy himself). 21
That Hein and Arizona Christian represent a new restrictive approach
to standing in establishment cases seems clear. Exactly how far they will go
to cut off taxpayer standing is still uncertain, but most of the rhetoric for
overruling Flast is now firmly in place, in the language of a majority deci-
sion carrying precedential weight.22 The three Justices who purported not
14. Id. at 1442-44.
15. Id. at 1445-48.
16. Justice Kennedy did point out that with spending measures the government directs funds to the
benefited organizations, while with tax credits the choice is made by private individuals. Id. at 1447-48.
Under decisions such as Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, that difference could potentially affect the merits
of the challengers' establishment claim, but it does not alter the fact that the decision being chal-
lenged-the creation of the tax benefit-was made by the government, and represented an exercise of
the state's taxing and spending powers. 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (allowing private school vouchers in
part on the ground that their use was directed by private choice).
17. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1453-55 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan's dissent was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Id. at 1450.
18. Id. at 1448-49 (majority opinion of Justice Kennedy).
19. 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
20. 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983).
21. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1448-49. Justice Kennedy also suggested, without much elabora-
tion, that in at least some of the other tax benefit cases, the challengers may have been able to rely on
some argument other than their taxpayer status to sustain standing. Id.
22. Consider, for example, Justice Kennedy's concluding flourish in Arizona Christian:
Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence in the
neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in the role of a Council
of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who dis-
838 [Vol 87:3
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to disturb Flast in Hein, all of whom subscribed to the majority's broad
attack on taxpayer standing in Arizona Christian, may well find themselves
ready in the next taxpayer case to join with Justices Scalia and Thomas in
casting Flast away.
Hein and Arizona Christian are not the only recent decisions to exhibit
a restrictive trend toward standing in Establishment Clause matters. Late in
the Rehnquist Court, the Court rather notoriously denied standing in Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. 23 The case involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of the 1954 statute inserting "under God" into the
Pledge of Allegiance. It was brought by the parent of a school child who
objected to the administration of the Pledge in his child's public school.
Despite the many prior decisions in which the Court had allowed parents to
litigate establishment matters on behalf of their children in school, the
Court rejected standing in this case on the rather technical ground that the
complaining parent (who was divorced from the child's custodial mother
but actively involved in the upbringing of his daughter), was not the child's
legally designated custodial parent. 24
More recently, standing issues arose in Salazar v. Buono, a case in-
volving a challenge to the erection of a cross on once-public land that had
been transferred by Congress to private ownership, allegedly to avoid a
federal injunction.25 Without directly ruling on the jurisdictional question,
the Court raised doubts about the challenger's continuing standing to press
the case once the property had been placed in private hands.26 Justices
Scalia and Thomas argued separately that the Court should have dismissed
the case for lack of standing. 27
Thus, after a long period of relative jurisdictional tranquility following
Flast, we have had four recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause deci-
sions either raising or enforcing significant new standing limitations, all in
agrees with them. In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with
prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be
more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so. Making the Article III stand-
ing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation,
which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress' power to change.
The present suit serves as an illustration of these principles.. . . To alter the rules of standing
or weaken their requisite elements would be inconsistent with the case-or-controversy limita-
tion on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III.
Id. at 1449. If the challenge in Arizona Christian is an "illustration of these principles," the challenge in
Flast probably is as well.
23. 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
24. Id. at 15-17.
25. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010).
26. Id. at 1814-15.
27. Id. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2012] 839
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the course of seven years. Such jurisdictional ferment, especially after a
long period of relative quiescence, naturally raises two questions: Why this
sudden shift? And what does it signify for the future of the Establishment
Clause?
It is, of course, never wholly possible to peer into the minds of the
Justices. In general, we take their written opinions at face value and largely
assume that the reasons the Justices give for their decisions are the actual
reasons behind their actions. Indeed, we regard such transparent, reasoned
decision making as one of the hallmarks of the judicial process-part of
what composes the judicial power and distinguishes it from legislative or
executive action.
Yet we also know from experience that some Court decisions betoken
more than they disclose. Historians poring over the papers of past Supreme
Court Justices have unearthed conference notes showing that the Justices
sometimes engage in vigorous debates about issues stretching well beyond
the particulars of the cases before them, that those debates sometimes affect
judgments about whether or not to exercise jurisdiction in particular mat-
ters, and that those underlying issues, when they do arise, seldom get
squarely acknowledged in the opinions the Justices issue. Whether there are
such side-bench undercurrents in any contemporary decision-and, if so,
what they are-may not be known for a generation or more, until some
present Justice's private papers are opened for public inspection. Where we
suspect that this sort of activity is afoot, the best we can do is try to read
between the lines of existing decisions and opinions, searching for signals
(either intentional or not) that suggest what those deeper undercurrents may
be.
Speculation about a back-story can occur in almost any context, but it
seems particularly apt when the Court acts out of historical character on a
particular issue, especially a jurisdictional one. When the Court suddenly
takes jurisdiction in a kind of case that it has previously refused to decide-
as happened, for example, in Baker v. Carr,28 or more recently in Bush v.
Gore29-it raises the distinct possibility that a major shift in judicial per-
spective or some other significant undercurrent may be driving the deci-
28. 369 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1962). In Baker, the Court reversed position on the issue of whether
challenges to legislative apportionment implicated a nonjusticiable political question. By accepting
jurisdiction, in part on a theory of harm through vote "dilution," id at 208, the Court paved the way for
its embrace of a one-person, one-vote standard under the Equal Protection Clause in Wesberry v. Sand-
ers, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964). Today, challenges to
legislative apportionment based on voter dilution are routine.
29. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Prior to Bush v. Gore, the tabulation of votes in an electoral recount was
left largely to the states. The Court (in)famously took jurisdiction in the Bush case to bring about clo-
sure to the highly disputed 2000 presidential election.
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sion. Conversely, a similar possibility arises when the Court suddenly de-
cides that jurisdiction is absent in a kind of case it has regularly handled on
the merits. Given the substantial interplay between jurisdiction and sub-
stantive doctrine that inheres under the Court's prevailing "test" for stand-
ing,30 the prospect that a shift on standing jurisdiction presages a shift on
merits seems to be nigh unavoidable.
This article represents an attempt to speculate about what may lie be-
hind the Court's recent choices regarding standing in Establishment Clause
matters-especially its move to sharply contain or even eliminate taxpayer
standing. I will develop two principal themes. The first is fairly straight-
forward: that the Court wants to cut down on the amount of Establishment
Clause litigation in the federal courts, and that it wants to do so in an
asymmetrical fashion which significantly reduces challenges to govern-
mental financial aid to religion and therefore increases the prospect that
such aid will be delivered. I will consider the reasons that the Court may
want to do that, and I will muse about some of the accompanying implica-
tions for Establishment Clause litigation and doctrine.
The second theme, which involves deeper speculation, and which
draws inspiration from Alexander Bickel's famous idea that refusing juris-
diction can involve the deliberate exercise of a "passive virtue," 31 is that
the Justices are preparing for a major substantive departure from existing
substantive Establishment Clause doctrine, but have not yet worked out the
contours of their new position and its rationale. Rather than perpetuating
existing law while they debate, or clouding doctrine with messy distinc-
tions, half-doctrines, or transitional rulings that are destined not to survive,
they would rather remain passive and relatively silent until the best oppor-
tunity arises for a bold transformative departure. While a cutoff of taxpayer
standing will not entirely advance this aim, it will substantially reduce the
number of instances in which the Court gets drawn into open controversy
over the Establishment Clause's future, and it will do so in some of the
messier and potentially more divisive cases. This may afford those Justices
who are already committed to the new departure the time and circumstanc-
es they need to hone their arguments and persuade other Justices who are
on the fence that theirs is the right direction to take.
30. For many years the Court has addressed standing issues by inquiring whether the party invok-
ing the court's jurisdiction can show "personal injury," that is "fairly traceable to the defendant's alleg-
edly unlawful conduct," and that is "likely to be redressed" through a judicial remedy. See Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
31. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 115-27 (2d ed. 1986).
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Whatever reason supports the Court's action in Hein and Arizona
Christian, the retreat from Flast has important ramifications for the practi-
cal content of the Establishment Clause. When the Court declines jurisdic-
tion on the contention that an entire class of plaintiffs (and hence of cases)
lies beyond the reach of judicial power, that decision contains an implicit
assertion that the subject matter of those cases falls within the largely unre-
viewable discretion of the government's political branches. Whatever the
political branches do, and however they do it, the matter will not come to
the Court for review unless it happens to touch on some other unrelated
legal issue. Thus, a decision to deny taxpayer standing in Establishment
cases is, inevitably, a decision to hand Congress and the Executive (and
their state government counterparts) broad and largely unreviewable discre-
tion about whether and how to treat religion in taxing and spending. It con-
verts the content of financial arrangements between church and state from a
judicial and constitutional to a purely political issue. It also renders the
commands of the First Amendment regarding government spending on
religion-whatever those commands may be-largely precatory rather than
mandatory in character.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE COURT REFORM
Anyone studying the development of Establishment Clause doctrine in
the Supreme Court quickly discovers that the frequency of Court decision
on Establishment Clause matters has increased progressively over time.
Nearly all Supreme Court law on the subject has been written in the last
sixty years. While the decades of the 1950s and 1960s involved a relative
handful of Supreme Court decisions on establishment matters, that number
increased substantially in the 1970s and thereafter. Two cases are principal-
ly responsible for this explosion of precedent. The first is Everson v. Board
of Education of Ewing Township,32 which officially applied the Establish-
ment Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The second
is Flast.
Before Everson, Supreme Court decisions on the establishment of re-
ligion were exceedingly rare. That is no doubt partly because the Estab-
lishment Clause, before Everson, was thought to apply only to the federal
government.33 State law and practice entailed far greater interaction be-
tween church and state than did federal law. State law on such matters as
32. 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
33. In Everson, the Court officially held that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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property ownership, land use, education, commerce, employment, taxation,
and the like inevitably encountered religious activities, calling forth an
array of state statutes and court decisions structuring the legal relationship
between religion and government. 34 Federal law, on the other hand, rarely
interacted with religion much at all.
Until the Everson decision, when states made choices that promoted or
supported religion, their action raised no federal question. School prayer,
compulsory Bible readings, holiday displays, Ten Commandment postings,
even the outright choice of a state church-none of it had federal constitu-
tional significance. Any protection for separation of church and state at the
state level depended on state law, as interpreted by state courts. From the
mid-nineteenth century onward, all states had state constitutional guaran-
tees of religious freedom, but their interpretation was quintessentially a
matter of state law, and most state courts treated the state constitutional
commands permissively.
After Everson, federal courts had to decide for the first time what
forms of state response to religion were or were not permitted under the
First Amendment. It is no surprise, then, that the Establishment Clause
cases which made their way to the Court in the first decade or two after
Everson almost exclusively involved matters of state law and practice.35
Indeed, the vast majority of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions
have concerned facets of state law and practice. Consequently, the Court's
decision in Everson to apply the Establishment Clause to the states signifi-
cantly expanded the scope and volume of practical federal jurisdiction over
matters touching the separation of church and state.
If Everson opened the federal court door to an array of establishment
challenges, Flast opened it even wider. Prior to Flast, cases where parties
had standing to challenge government taxing or spending policies allegedly
in aid of religion were relatively rare. Cases of that sort did arise occasion-
ally. Everson itself, for example, involved a challenge by taxpayers to a
state scheme for reimbursing students' travel expenses to private and paro-
chial schools. 36 But the circumstances where taxpayers could sue were
fairly unusual. As Justice Jackson put it in Doremus v. Board of Education
34. For an interesting discussion of the development of state law on religion during the 19th
century, see generally MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
THE GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
35. Examples include the "released time" cases-involving state public school laws providing
time for religious instruction-such as Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) and McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), as well as the "Sunday closing" cases-involving state laws prohibiting
business activity on Sunday-collected in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
36. 330 U.S. at 3.
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of Hawthorne, the requirement to demonstrate some form of tangible
"pocket-book" injury, as opposed to mere "religious difference," tended to
halt most challenges at (or even before) the courthouse door.37 Taxpayer
standing, where it existed, depended on evidence of specific exactions tied
fairly closely to specific religious benefits or uses. Spending to support
religion that came from general appropriations was relatively immune from
constitutional challenge. 38
By opening the courthouse door to taxpayers, Flast enabled the devel-
opment of a regular flow of establishment challenges to taxing and spend-
ing measures at both the federal and state levels. To be sure, there have
been many Establishment Clause challenges over the years since Flast that
did not depend either directly or indirectly on taxpayer standing. But there
have been many others that did, and they include some of the Court's lead-
ing doctrinal decisions, as well as some of its most controversial rulings.
Significantly, they include Lemon v. Kurtzman39 and many subsequent
cases that developed and applied Lemon 's three-prong "test" for ascertain-
ing an Establishment Clause violation. They also include Walz, 40
Mueller,41 and other decisions involving claims of unconstitutional prefer-
ential tax treatment of religion. And they include challenges to an array of
state and federal spending measures, particularly in support of education
and social services, which made funds available to religiously affiliated
recipients. 42
Consequently, much of the Establishment Clause law we have today
owes its existence, in whole or in part, to cases where jurisdiction depended
on Flast. Instead of the relatively small handful of cases occasionally grap-
pling with Establishment Clause issues that marked the Court's work in the
pre-Flast era, the Court's docket proliferated to include dozens of deci-
37. 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952).
38. For discussions of taxpayer standing in federal court that preceded Flast, see generally Nor-
man Dorsen, The Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to Parochial Schools
and Standing to Bring Suit, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 35 (1962); Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Sum-
mary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
39. 403 U.S. 602, 608, 611 (1971) (identifying challengers as "citizens and taxpayers" of Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania).
40. 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970) (challenge by property-owner-taxpayer challenging property tax
exemption for religious properties used for religious worship).
41. 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983) (challenge by taxpayers to tax deductions for educational expenses
at religious private schools).
42. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 762 (1973)
(organization and individual plaintiffs who were "residents and taxpayers" challenging New York
financial aid program for nonpublic schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 597 (1988) (challenge
by federal taxpayers to provisions of federal family planning grant program).
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sions, making Establishment Clause discourse a recurrent staple of the
Court's doctrinal diet.
The growth in jurisdiction not only added to the Court's Establishment
Clause docket; it also added to the complexity and contention surrounding
Establishment Clause doctrine. It seems fair to surmise that Establishment
Clause constitutional discourse in the post-Flast period has been neither
productive nor satisfying for most members of the Court. Despite many
attempts to formulate a consensus-based system of doctrinal tenets that
could be used to produce a reasonably consistent set of legal outcomes, the
Court has remained locked in a perpetual doctrinal tug-of-war between
those Justices who favor relatively strict principles of church-state separa-
tion and those who favor a more flexible and accommodating approach.
For decades, this tension has produced ongoing conflict over the legal con-
tent of the Clause, in which neither side has consistently prevailed, and
neither side has given ground. To borrow loosely from Gertrude Stein,
there has been fairly little "there there" 43 in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence over much of the past forty years.
Looking principally at results, one may infer that in the first two dec-
ades after Flast, the Court took a relatively strict approach toward church-
state interaction that aimed toward securing a substantial degree of both
formal and functional governmental neutrality in matters touching on reli-
gion.44 In contrast, during the last two decades, the Court has more often
deviated from this position in ways that have allowed greater latitude for
both formal acknowledgment of religion and indirect methods of govern-
ment financial support.45 But neither of these trends brought with it much if
any doctrinal consistency or conviction. In both periods, decisions vacillat-
ed from one position to the other based on shifting majorities in the Court
while the Justices continuously debated (without much firm resolution)
43. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 215 (1938) (commenting that "there is no
there there" in Oakland, California, her childhood home).
44. The cases from this period include Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756; and Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, all of which sustained restrictions on
government authority to provide various forms of assistance to religiously affiliated private schools.
They also include Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980),
which placed restrictions on religious expression in public schools.
45. The cases from this period include Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Zelnan v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); and Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), all of which permitted either aid to religiously affiliated schools
or public religious expression.
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what the controlling constitutional principles ought to be and how they
should be applied.46
What occurred in the Supreme Court almost surely was reflected in
the lower courts as well. The built-in selectivity of the Court's use of the
writ of certiorari suggests that the lower federal courts decided many cases
based on taxpayer standing that never made it to Supreme Court review.
These cases were frequent enough to make taxpayer-based Establishment
Clause litigation a regular component of the federal docket. Additionally,
because the lower courts' job is to interpret and apply the precedent of the
Supreme Court, the indeterminacy and vacillation in Supreme Court estab-
lishment doctrine was no doubt reflected in the reasoning and decisions of
the lower courts, with lots of uncertainty, doctrinal tension and inconsisten-
cy from case to case and court to court.
What should the Supreme Court do about an area of litigation that is
constant, time-consuming, complicated, and with high constitutional stakes,
but at the same time is often fruitless, fraught with uncertainty, and prone
to inconsistent outcomes? One answer is to cut back on the amount of liti-
gation itself, and one of the surest ways to do that is to tighten the jurisdic-
tional strings so that fewer plaintiffs may bring such actions. Among the
most direct ways to do that is to eliminate the one doctrine that gave liti-
gants greater access to courts in establishment cases than they enjoyed in
other areas of law.
Thus an undercurrent in both Justice Alito's plurality opinion in Hein
and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Arizona Christian is that the
potential judicial interference with taxing and spending spawned by Flast is
unseemly.47 Justice Kennedy's Arizona Christian opinion, in particular,
develops the general theme that judicial review of legislative exercises of
the taxing and spending power, in cases brought by mere taxpayers, repre-
sents an abuse of judicial authority.48 It is, in his view, something the fed-
46. For example, during the earlier post-Flast period the Court allowed legislative prayer in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), holiday Nativity displays in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), and higher education grants for seminarians in Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), while in the latter period it put restrictions on prayer in certain school
settings in both Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992).
47. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 605-08 (2007); Ariz. Chris-
tian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-45, 1449 (2011).
48. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct.. at 1443-44 (arguing that taxpayer claims challenging tax credits
"rest on unjustifiable economic and political speculation" and that "[e]ach of the inferential steps to
show causation and redressability [sic] depends on premises as to which there remains considerable
doubt"). Justice Kennedy's argument assumes that to establish standing, taxpayers must show that their
own tax burden was increased as a result of government action, and that an injunction against the
challenged tax break would lead to a reduction in taxes. This argument treats the taxpayer as asserting a
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eral courts should not be doing. While many of Kennedy's comments are
phrased as general propositions, the structure of his reasoning rests on the
assumption that what is true of taxpayer suits in general ought equally to be
true under the Establishment Clause. Taxpayers ought to have no special
status in Establishment Clause matters. Their injury from compulsory taxa-
tion in aid of religion ought not to carry any special weight. If taxpayers
raising other complaints do not sustain "injury in fact" sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, neither do taxpayers who object to government spending in
support of religion. Their injury, from a constitutional standpoint, is no
injury at all. 49
Viewed in this light, Hein and Arizona Christian take their place along
with decisions in other contexts that have also cut back on the scope of the
federal docket. They fit within a larger pattern of recent Court decisions
that have fought against the rising tide of federal civil litigation by tighten-
ing pleading requirements,50 limiting remedies, 51 strengthening litigation
avoidance devices like arbitration clauseS, 52 and altering the procedural and
proof requirements of class actions. 53
Exactly how far the Court will take this reasoning is still unclear. Hein
purported not to quarrel with Flast on its own terms, and by treating tax
credits as different from spending Arizona Christian stopped just short of
overruling Flast. To borrow the idiom of finance, it is clear that Flast's
stock has fallen, but it is not yet certain how far, or whether the ruling will
collapse into bankruptcy and final liquidation. It is still possible that the
Court will resist calls from Justices Scalia and Thomas to overrule Flast
entirely. 54 If so, the Flast standing rule might be retained for the most fla-
grant forms of government religious spending. But it seems more likely
(particularly given the staunchly anti-taxpayer-standing reasoning in Arizo-
purely economic harm. It ignores the claim that the harm is not the amount of tax burden, but the fact
that it integral to an alleged system for subsidizing religious education. Under this view (which was the
view taken by the Court in Flast) the harm is caused by the government's creation of the allegedly
unconstitutional subsidy, and it is fully redressed by the elimination of the subsidy (whatever its form),
whether taxes go down or not.
49. Justice Kennedy's opinion does acknowledge the Flast rule, but apparently confines it to
circumstances where "moneys have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious institution
in violation of the citizens' conscience." Id. at 1448. Absent such an immediate connection between
"extract[ion] and spen[ding]," the opinion implies the standards of Flast cannot be satisfied. Id at 1446
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
50. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
51. Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 (2009).
52. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).




na Christian) that the current cutbacks on Flast are stepping stones towards
an outright overruling that is likely to occur sometime in the relatively near
future. The HeinlArizona Christian dyad thus supports the fairly straight-
forward inference that the Court is attempting to cut back on the amount
and frequency of Establishment Clause litigation, and in the process to lop
off the cases that put the courts in their most awkward position vis-A-vis the
other branches of government.
Behind this impulse may lie the belief that the volume and frequency
of Establishment Clause litigation since Flast is at least partly responsible
for the doctrinal dissension and confusion that have accompanied it. If this
is true, then having fewer cases (and practically none on matters of taxing
and spending) might enable Establishment Clause doctrine to develop more
gradually and also perhaps more clearly. For one thing, it would be more
focused, since the cases coming to court would be more similar to one an-
other in the types of potential aid to religion they involved. For another, the
actions of government allegedly in conflict with the Establishment Clause
would have to have some sort of regulatory or programmatic component
that acted directly on the activities of the litigants before the Court. This
would arguably give the issues before the Court a more consistent texture,
making its decisions potentially more harmonious with one another in out-
come and impact. In any event, in a period of great doctrinal confusion,
arguably any cutback on the amount of Establishment Clause litigation may
be a good thing, since multiplying the cases only multiplies the opportuni-
ties for further disagreement on the Court, compounding the resulting doc-
trinal confusion.
It is also possible that the Court senses a greater potential for reaching
consensus on the non-financial aspects of government involvement with
religion than it does on matters involving financial affairs. Past decisions-
particularly those involving various forms of government support for pri-
vate (including religious) education-have reflected a particularly high
degree of disagreement on the Court, with outcomes often turning on ex-
ceedingly fine distinctions between different kinds of aid in different con-
texts. By eliminating these cases on jurisdictional grounds, the Court would
be eliminating an arena of Establishment Clause litigation in which it has
had a particularly hard time finding a common thread and rationale.
This "court reform" reading carries with it some important implica-
tions for the content of Establishment Clause doctrine. First, it distin-
guishes among different types of government behavior in terms of their
potential Establishment Clause implications. Laws with a significant regu-
latory content presumably will still be subject to challenge by those who
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come under their aegis, because the regulated individuals experience a
direct harm as a result of their duty to comply with the regulatory com-
mand.55 So will laws (and official governmental action) that affect the pro-
grams and policies of public institutions, such as public schools, which can
be challenged by those who are subjected to them.56 Similarly, symbolic
linkages between government and religion, such as holiday displays and
Ten Commandment displays,57 may still be subject to challenge, at least by
those who can claim injury through regular (perhaps mandatory) exposure
to them.58 In all these instances, there are potential challengers who do not
need to rely on taxpayer standing to formulate their claims of injury in fact.
Law on the Establishment Clause thus will continue to develop in these
areas, although it may be slowed in part by the somewhat greater challenge
involved in establishing the factual records needed to support non-taxpayer
standing.
What will get cut off from court review if Flast is overruled are laws
that structure funding opportunities for religious uses or activities, or that
confer financial benefit in the form of preferential tax relief. In those in-
stances, non-taxpayer standing will be difficult if not impossible to formu-
late, so that the number of cases surviving jurisdictional challenge is likely
to fall off considerably, if not entirely disappear.
This development says something that is at least partly substantive
about the Establishment Clause. It supports a typological hierarchy of po-
tential issues. Those actions of government that involve "command and
control" regulation arguably are at the top of that hierarchy, with the great-
est prospect for standing, and hence the greatest likelihood of being suc-
cessfully challenged. Anyone whose behavior is subject to the law's
command or control obviously experiences direct injury in fact from the
legal consequences that flow from refusing to comply.
Next come actions of government that communicate an ideological (in
this context either religious or antireligious) message. Standing may be a
55. An example might be a case like Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., which struck down a
Connecticut statute requiring employers to allow their employees time off on the employees' chosen
religious day of rest or worship. 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
56. An example would be a case like Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist,. involving school-sponsored
prayers at public high school football games. 530 U.S. 290, 294-95 (2000).
57. Examples include the holiday displays at issue in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)
and Allegheny Cnty. v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) and the Ten Commandment
displays in McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 681 (2005).
58. Challengers will, however, have to meet the factual requirements set by cases such as Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, which require actual imminent exposure to allegedly unlawful conditions. 504
U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
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bit harder to come by, but there will be some individuals who can mount a
claim to types of injury in fact the Court may be prepared to recognize.
Additionally, even if standing is unavailable for such claims as an Estab-
lishment Clause matter, claims under the First Amendment's Speech
Clause will also sometimes be available, and in that environment the
Court's position on what constitutes injury remains relatively generous. 59
Standing will be discernibly more difficult, but not wholly impossible,
in cases involving relatively passive government symbolism. Mere aware-
ness or occasional exposure to the symbol will not likely be enough. But
challenges will still be possible for those who can claim regular and con-
tinuous exposure to the symbols in question, especially where that exposure
is effectively mandatory or unavoidable.60
In contrast, without Flast standing will be nigh impossible in cases in-
volving financial relationships between church and state. 61 Beneficiaries of
those measures will lack either motive or injury to challenge them. Would-
be religious beneficiaries might challenge the terms of distribution, but lack
any motive to challenge the program of benefits itself. Nonreligious com-
petitors for tax relief or spending will lack standing on the grounds, among
others, that any injury they might claim is purely hypothetical and incapa-
ble of redress. In other words, without taxpayer standing there will be none
who can come forward with an alternative basis for invoking jurisdiction.
Thus, effectively, an entire class of Establishment Clause litigation will be
cut off from judicial cognizance and review.
This litigation hierarchy also says something about the jurisdictional
significance of psychic harm from religious preference. In the regulatory,
ideological and symbolic categories, claims based on psychic harm from
what Justice Jackson in Doremus termed "religious difference" 62 can at
least sometimes support a merits decision. In financial cases, however,
once Flast is gone psychic harm either is not recognized, or is of insuffi-
cient weight to matter. As long as government steers clear of certain for-
mal, regulatory, ideological or symbolic religious preferences or choices, it
may provide functional financial religious support with relative immunity.
59. However, speech challenges may well founder on the merits, given the Court's increasing
tendency to afford "government speech" immunity from attack on First Amendment grounds. See
Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009) (rejecting speech claims against public park
display of Ten Commandments in part due to permissibility of viewpoint and content discrimination
under "government speech" doctrine).
60. Examples would include exposure to religious symbolism in public schools with mandatory
attendance, or in a courthouse, where litigants and witnesses have no choice but to be present.
61. See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1034-35.
62. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. Of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952).
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There is another important quasi-substantive implication of Flast's
imminent demise. In the past, when the Court has upheld government
spending in support of religious activities, it has often either explicitly or
implicitly attached conditions that the spending be used for activities of
religious organizations that are not explicitly sacramental, institutional, or
proselytizing in character. 63 Thus, for example, when the Court allowed
government funding for construction of educational facilities at religious
colleges, it did so in part on the strength of legislative conditions that the
funding could not be used for houses of worship.64 When and if Flast goes,
the need for such restrictions on government spending presumably will also
disappear, since even funding that finds its way to explicitly religious uses
will be remain effectively immune from judicial challenge.
Finally, as I have argued at length elsewhere, cutoff of taxpayer stand-
ing says something about the nature of constitutionally cognizable Estab-
lishment Clause injury.65 It either denies or substantially devalues the
psychic injury that occurs from compulsory tax-and-spend-based support
for religion. It also draws a constitutional distinction between direct and
indirect means of favoring religion. Thus, for example, if the government
were to command that every individual must give a portion of his or her
wealth to a church, its command and control of private spending could
potentially offend the Establishment Clause and those subject to the law
would likely have standing to object. But if the government took that same
wealth out of private hands through general taxes, and then gave a portion
of it to religion in the form of a government appropriation, without taxpay-
er standing no one would experience cognizable harm, and no one would
have the standing to mount a constitutional challenge. Spending on religion
would be, from this perspective, no different in constitutional substance
than spending on public health (the form of spending that had been chal-
lenged in Frothingham), spending on public highways and parks, or spend-
ing on public schools. As in these other cases constitutional complaints
about spending in aid of religion would have no chance of being heard in a
federal court. The only appeal would be to the legislature.
Thus, one possible reading of the no-taxpayer standing rule emerging
from Hein and Arizona Christian is that it is a measure of "court reform"
meant to confine establishment litigation to regulatory, ideological, and
symbolic measures, with little if any judicial oversight over financial inter-
63. For detailed discussion of this issue, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840-44 (2000)
(O,Connor, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1971) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
65. Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1055-56, 1072-73.
2012] 851
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
actions between religion and government. From this perspective, the Estab-
lishment Clause is about message, not money.
II. BREATHING SPACE
The frequency of Establishment Clause litigation during the past forty
years has almost surely been further compounded by the Court's perpetual
division over fundamental doctrine. In the early years following Flast, the
Court agreed on the general doctrinal contours of Establishment Clause
law, which it arranged around the three "prongs" of the Lemon standard,66
though the Justices often disagreed intensely over their proper application.
Then, beginning in the 1980s and extending apace to the present, the Court
has disagreed over both the content of doctrine and its proper application.
That period has witnessed a prolonged stretch of experimentation and ad-
vocacy by different coalitions of Justices engaged in an attempt to supplant
prevailing doctrinal tenets with new formulae that the proposing Justices
believe would more accurately capture the Clause's meaning.67 Typically
the proposals would also allow substantially more room for governmental
support of religious entities and activities.
In the main, these experiments have not borne much fruit. For exam-
ple, as early as 1993 in his famous Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Un-
ion Free School District concurrence, Justice Scalia explicitly proposed
abandonment of the Lemon approach, which he concluded had become
totally moribund.68 Yet nearly twenty years later-in cases such as
McCreary-we still see references to Lemon, 69 which the Court still evi-
dently sometimes uses to organize inquiry, even though Lemon may no
longer retain much force for directing outcomes.
What is particularly noteworthy about this period of thesis and antith-
esis is that it has failed to date to produce any lasting synthesis. Instead it
has produced seemingly endless dissension, not a little acrimony, and a
66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("Every analysis in this area must begin
with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statue
must no foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."') (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of City of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970)).
67. For examples of cases proposing alternative formulae, see Zelman v. Simmons-Haris, 536 U.S.
639, 649 (2002); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08; and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
68. 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing Lemon to a "ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried....").
69. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859-66 (2005) (relying on Lemon's "secular
legislative purpose" prong to hold a Ten Commandment display in a county courthouse unconstitution-
al).
852 [Vol 87:3
COURT REFORM UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
succession of quasi-tests and counter-tests that appear and disappear from
the Court's decisions as the majorities and writers of majority opinions
change. The Justices have remained resolutely locked in irresolution, leav-
ing observers with a strong sense that Establishment Clause doctrine is
moving neither forward nor backward but sideways. In a recent dissent
from denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas recently commented critically on
this unfortunate state of affairs. 70
One result of all this unchanneled ferment has been that, today, lower
courts facing Establishment Clause issues sometimes find it prudent to
apply not a single doctrinal formula, but various alternative formulae in
succession, in an effort to resolve the constitutional issues in the case in a
way that will insulate the decision from further review by avoiding the risk
that a reviewing court will eschew one test in favor of another. As a conse-
quence, we do not have a single set of controlling Establishment Clause
principles. Instead, we have various tests that simultaneously overlap and
diverge, so that it is never wholly possible to discern in advance which test
should be uppermost in determining the outcome. When the tests coalesce
and produce the same result, that is not too serious a problem; but when the
tests point in different directions and lead to different outcomes as they
sometimes do, it generates a fair amount of confusion.
When a court is so embroiled, what should it do? One answer is to
keep trying, but that way lies further potential uncertainty and confusion.
Another answer might be to stop trying to do so much. Perhaps, if the
Court were to stop kneading the Establishment Clause and give it a bit of a
rest, the yeast of new doctrine could begin to rise, and take shape. This
might particularly be true if the Justices continued to discuss Establishment
Clause issues among themselves in the privacy of the Supreme Court con-
ference71 without the constant necessity of coming to decision. After a
period of rumination and more desultory, less constantly decision-driven
exchange, it might be possible for the Justices to concoct a new blend of
principles that are neither Lemon nor "anti-Lemon," but rather different
from the various previous formulations, and that stand some chance of
achieving consensus across the Court's juridical-political divides. Perhaps
that process of moving toward consensus requires a period of gestation that
is incommensurate with the press of constant decision.
70. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. _ , No. 10-1276, slip. op., at 4
(Oct. 31, 2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that "[o]ur jurisprudence
provides no principled bases by which a lower court could discern whether Lemon/endorsement, or
some other test, should apply in Establishment Clause cases").
71. This can occur in the context of debates over whether or not to grant certiorari, since by
tradition denials of certiorari need not be explained, and written dissents from denial are rare.
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The need for rumination, if it exists, invites an exercise of what Alex-
ander Bickel famously termed the Court's "passive virtues"-a way of
avoiding decision without evidently surrendering the Court's commitment
to the rule of law.72 Bickel argued that one of the more potent means for
exercising passive virtue is for the Court to decline jurisdiction on grounds
that the matter at hand presents a non-justiciable question. Of all the doc-
trines that lend themselves to such jurisdictional passivity, standing is
among the most potentially useful.
As critics of Bickel's thesis noted, in the Supreme Court itself there is
a more immediate expedient for passive virtue than justiciability: the denial
of certiorari. 73 The Court could (and often does) avoid the necessity of
deciding messy issues of all sorts by the simple expedient of denying certi-
orari. It has surely done so on many occasions involving the Establishment
Clause. 74 As Justice Thomas noted in a recent dissent to denial of certiora-
ri, the Court may well be doing precisely that in cases involving govern-
ment use of crosses to memorialize the dead.75
There are several difficulties with the Court's exercise of certiorari as
a means of obtaining "breathing space" on the Establishment Clause. The
first is that certiorari is governed by the "rule of four," which enables a
minority of Justices to place a case on the Court's docket for argument and
decision. That means that even if a majority of Justices prefers to wait,
perhaps while they carry on discussions about the proper content of new
doctrine, a minority can push the Court to judgment. Since the tough cases
under the Establishment Clause typically produce slim majorities at best, a
determined minority could prevent reliance on certiorari denial as a tool for
exercising passive virtue.
Second, denial of certiorari does nothing to the law-doctrine remains
whatever it was before the Court denied certiorari-and it does nothing
regarding the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Lower courts will
continue to hear and decide cases, and in doing so they will be obliged to
apply existing Establishment Clause doctrine as best they can. If the Court
declines certiorari, the lower courts' interpretation of the doctrine stands as
72. Bickel, supra note 31, at 122-27.
73. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1964) (noting the similarity between standing
and the Supreme Court's use of certiorari).
74. Cf Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (concluding that even
where cases lie within the Court's Article III jurisdiction the Court must "guard jealously and exercise
rarely our power to make constitutional pronouncements ... when matters of great national significance
are at stake").
75. Utah Highway PatrolAss'n, 565 U.S. _, No. 10-1276 (Oct. 31, 2011) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari).
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precedent, at least for the circuit or state court system in which it was ren-
dered. Where at least four Justices on the Court are convinced that the law
as it stands is likely wrong, and thus are further convinced that the decision
of the court below applying that law is also (a fortiori) wrong, it becomes
very difficult for those Justices to exercise discretion by withholding deci-
sion. Doing so (from the hypothetical four Justices' perspective) perpetu-
ates constitutional error. Although the Supreme Court long ago ceased to
function as a court of errors, it still must require considerable discipline for
the Justices to let a run of seemingly wrong lower court decisions in such
an important area of constitutional law go untouched. This is no doubt par-
ticularly difficult when the lower courts are attempting to forbid the politi-
cal branches of government from making taxing and spending decisions
that enjoy (both in theory and likely in practice) widespread popular sup-
port.76
Third (and this difficulty aggravates the second), when the Court de-
nies certiorari, the law (such as it is) remains unchanged. Lower courts will
continue to decide cases on the merits, and when they do they will be
obliged to follow older decisions that are on point, even if those decisions
no longer reflect the Court's current majority thinking. Denial of certiorari
doesn't make the lower court decisions go away, and each lower court de-
cision adds something to the weight of the authority the Court is (by hy-
pothesis) working its way toward eventually changing or discarding
entirely. Any flaws in existing doctrine will be not only perpetuated but
also to some degree entrenched, making it that much harder for the Court to
set off in a different direction when it is finally ready to do so.
Although the Court's certiorari-denying practices rarely get much at-
tention outside the legal and political science academy, that situation could
change if it became too apparent that the Court was dodging tough consti-
tutional questions by simply ignoring the cases that presented them. "Deni-
al" at the Supreme Court would take on a new and fairly pejorative
meaning. This would be particularly true if those cases involved situations
where lower courts declared important taxing or spending decisions by
state legislatures to be unconstitutional, as could have happened in Arizona
Christian, or declared popular presidential spending initiatives unconstitu-
tional, as could have happened below in Hein. It would be even worse if
the lower courts made similar determinations about taxing and spending
76. Federal courts are particularly reluctant to intervene in state fiscal decisions, as the recent
decision in Hornev. Flores attests. 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2579 (2009). Consequently, when a lower federal
court enjoins a state spending measure on constitutional grounds, the state is almost sure to petition for
review, and the Supreme Court is highly likely to grant certiorari.
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decisions by Congress. Imagine, for example, the outcry if the Court had
denied certiorari in the various recent cases challenging the constitutionali-
ty of the so-called "individual mandate" in health care reform legislation. 77
Enter the issue of standing. What if it were possible to slow down the
pace and frequency of decision on the most pesky establishment issues, not
only in the Supreme Court but in the lower courts as well? If the Court
could somehow cut back on the whole federal docket of Establishment
Clause cases, it might be possible to secure the period of relative decisional
inactivity that the Court needs to work its way toward a new way of think-
ing. This would be particularly true if the standing rule cut off jurisdiction
in a class of cases where the Court's views were the least well formulated
(or the most consistently divided), leaving jurisdiction intact in other cir-
cumstances where the formulation of a coherent new set of principles
seemed more promising. It would also be particularly true if the cutoff of
jurisdiction happened in cases where any lower court decisions going
against the government would involve the kind of inter-branch confronta-
tion that would put intense pressure on the Justices to intervene.
From this "breathing space" standpoint, the advantages of cutting back
on taxpayer standing are particularly attractive for at least three reasons.
First, the taxpayer standing rule of Flast is Establishment-Clause-specific.
Given that taxpayer standing is already largely forbidden everywhere
else,78 a decision to cut off that means for mounting an Establishment
Clause challenge will not have any significant spillover to any other legal
issue. There will be few, if any, unintended consequences for other areas of
federal jurisdiction or federal law. Often, on jurisdictional matters, courts
have to exercise care lest by deciding that they do not like standing in one
class of cases, their decision creates precedent applicable to another class
of cases where they think standing is appropriate. Not so here. Since Flast
is a legal-issue-specific ruling, so is a rule rejecting Flast.
Second, the standing decision in this situation is categorical.79 Very
often-as, for example, in some of the environmental standing cases 80-a
77. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/supreme-court-to-hear-case-challenging-
health-law.html?_r--l&hp-&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1325177174-kECvgFee23h6kz4pluTgMw.
78. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343-47 (2006).
79. In this respect, a rule rejecting taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause would mirror
the effect of the Court's ruling in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974), denying
taxpayer standing under the Statements and Accounts Clause, U.S Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 7. The effect of
Richardson has been to render the constitutional obligations of the Accounts Clause (whatever they
might be) both unreviewable and unenforceable by the courts. There is virtually no decisional law on
that issue, because no one can bring it into court.
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decision regarding standing is based on factual criteria that if denied in one
instance can, in subsequent decisions, be effectively overcome by a suffi-
ciently determined set of would-be plaintiffs assisted by sufficiently clever
and diligent legal counsel. Here, in contrast, a decision of no standing for
the taxpayers in Hein or in Arizona Christian is effectively a decision of no
standing for all taxpayers in comparable legal circumstances. It is the status
of the plaintiff and the type of her injury, not the amount or timing of it,
which controls the outcome. No other taxpayer will be able to surmount the
standing barrier, either. Nor will anyone get the case to court on some al-
ternative standing theory.
Third, the impact of ruling is asymmetrical in relation to substantive
disputes about the content of the Establishment Clause. Denying taxpayer
standing affects only those litigants who want stricter separation of church
and state. It insulates from review only measures that tend to favor greater
church-state interaction and that betoken potential increases in government
financial support for religiously affiliated activities and organizations.
Standing does not always have that kind of outcome-determinative valence,
but it certainly does here. If that is (as I strongly suspect it is) the direction
that any new substantive doctrinal departure from the Roberts Court is
likely to take, the cutoff of taxpayer standing both prefigures and dovetails
with the coming doctrinal shift.
A categorical rule on standing could, in theory, present difficulties for
a Court intent on eventually replacing existing substantive doctrine if it cut
off from consideration the very cases that could afford vehicles for an-
nouncing the change. But in the Establishment Clause context that is not
really a problem, because there will be other Establishment Clause cases
that remain in the Court's jurisdiction, and in some respects they may be
better vehicles for making a doctrinal sea-change. In the United States,
government support for religion usually comes in one of two different vari-
eties. The first is substantive or functional support, which typically in-
volves transfers of wealth through the auspices of tax benefits, spending,
transfers of property, or some combination. The second is more formal,
expressive, or symbolic support, as occurs when religious expression is
privileged in a public space; the government absorbs religious messages
into its own expression or symbolism; or the government exercises its regu-
latory power to advance religious activity. 8' An anti-Flast rule cuts off
80. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
81. Cf Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999-1006 (1990) (distinguishing between "formal" and "substantive" conceptions
of neutrality in religious freedom cases).
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litigation on the first kind of government support at the pass. It simply
stops those cases from coming to federal court, but it does little or nothing
to affect jurisdiction in the other kinds of government support case-the
ones where religious messages or activities get privileged or endorsed. 82 In
those arenas, the Court has allowed standing based on other personal char-
acteristics besides taxpayer status, and it has acknowledged the presence of
intangible psychic harm as a ground for "injury in fact." Unless the Court
were to amend its standing views in those cases, they would remain on the
lower court dockets, and the lower court decisions would provide continu-
ing opportunities for eventual Supreme Court review.
The overall effect would be this: one entire class of difficult Estab-
lishment Clause cases where denying certiorari will be most difficult would
go away, while another class of difficult Establishment Clause cases would
remain. Establishment Clause litigation would by no means disappear, but
its content would shift toward issues of expression and symbolism or coer-
cive power rather than money, and toward matters of form rather than func-
tion. Since those cases rarely present the same sort of sweeping challenge
to the existence of legislative and executive power, using certiorari denial
as a way of keeping at least some of them off the Court docket may well be
more satisfactory. And allowing lower court decisions to stand while the
Court hunts a new doctrine will arguably do less overall long-term damage,
since the merits decisions will often rest on factual nuances that facilitate
ready legal distinction.
One interesting consequence of a move to cut off taxpayer standing in
federal court is that it could well push some taxpayer cases into state court.
The Supreme Court's dictates about the limits on judicial power under
Article III obviously do not bind state courts, which derive their judicial
power not from Article III but from their state constitutions.83 In many state
courts, moreover, taxpayer standing is a relatively common (or at least not
entirely unheard of) phenomenon, and jurisdictional limitations on suits by
taxpayers are considerably more flexible than they are at the federal level. 84
Theoretically, then, one response to an overruling of Flast at the federal
level would be for challengers of state schemes for funding religion to take
their claims to state court. Those courts would be obliged to apply federal
constitutional doctrine to the merits, but as a practical matter their decisions
82. See discussion in Part 1, supra.
83. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
84. JOHN MARTINEZ & MICHAEL LIBONATI, 4 SANDS' AND LIBONATI's LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW § 29:7 (2009) (noting that state courts of equity historically recognized taxpayer challenges to
unlawful acts of local government).
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would be immune from substantive Supreme Court review unless they
ruled against the government.85 Given the historic tendency of state courts
to favor greater church-government interaction than their federal counter-
parts, coupled with the prospect that most state courts will be loathe in any
event to intervene on federal constitutional grounds in decisions by their
own legislatures or executives, the need for the Court to take jurisdiction
from this source presumably would be rare.
If state courts were particularly vigilant in giving existing Establish-
ment Clause doctrine a separationist cast, this jurisdictional consequence
could theoretically impede Supreme Court efforts to forge a new (assumed-
ly more permissive) approach. But that is unlikely. Particularly in matters
like Arizona Christian where the challengers are facing off against the
state's governor and legislature, the likelihood of a state court intervening
to upset the other branches' taxing or spending choices seems remote. This
is particularly true where popular opinion runs in favor of religious support,
and it is especially true in jurisdictions where the state judges themselves
may eventually face election. Historically, with a few exceptions, state
courts have taken a largely flexible and accommodating view of their own
state constitutional restrictions on support of religion. So if taxpayer cases
go to state court, the more likely outcome is that the courts' substantive
decisions will help rather than hinder a project of reframing Establishment
Clause doctrine in a more permissive direction.
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
What I have discussed thus far treats jurisdiction and doctrine as inter-
related but still analytically separate categories of reasoning. But in the
Establishment Clause context, there are particularly strong reasons to think
that a decision about jurisdiction is also very much a decision about merits.
This is especially true when a decision about jurisdiction equally affects an
entire class of potential plaintiffs, with the result of curtailing jurisdiction
for an entire class of Establishment Clause cases. Such a decision is more
than a decision on standing. It is also a substantive interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.
Initially, as I have argued at length elsewhere, a decision to deny tax-
payer standing under the Establishment Clause makes a powerful statement
about what does (and more importantly what does not) constitute harm-
85. ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617-18 (parties who lose a state court action on a matter of federal law
have standing to seek Supreme Court review because "they are under a defined and specific legal
obligation . .. which causes them direct injury").
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what counts as injury for constitutional purposes, and what does not. 86 To
fully understand this statement about the nature of injury, one must recon-
struct what Flast said and did, as well as how Flast has been understood
subsequently. Flast did not rest its finding of standing solely on the finan-
cial interest of taxpayers. Rather, it coupled that financial interest with what
the Court then perceived to be a closely connected psychic harm-the inju-
ry one experiences by being compelled to give financial support to religion.
In Flast, the Court drew on the origins of the Establishment Clause to rec-
ognize that government-compelled exactions to support religion were un-
acceptable to the framers, and that the psychic burden of such compelled
exaction falls directly on taxpayers.87 It was the financial harm (which was
admittedly slight) plus the Establishment Clause-specific psychic harm
caused by an impermissible compelled exaction (which the Court regarded
as both real and substantial) that supplied the requisite injury in fact.
By linking taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause with
taxpayer standing in other venues, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Arizona
Christian disregards that historic connection.88 His opinion thus essentially
treats the harm caused to taxpayers by taxing and spending to support reli-
gion as little different from the harm caused by any other allegedly illegal
or unconstitutional taxing or spending measure. The logical thrust of this
reasoning is to demote the constitutional status of the psychic harm itself.
Government financial support for religion is no longer a form of constitu-
tionally cognizable injury. It is not, therefore, the kind of harm that the
Establishment Clause was meant to prevent. Or, alternatively, it was some-
thing the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent, but the framers failed
to provide any workable constitutional method of preventing it. Either the
First Amendment gives no right to prevent compelled exaction in aid of
religion, or it gives a "right" that is effectively unenforceable-one to
which the power of judicial review does not run. This is presently the situa-
tion for individuals attacking executive grant practices under Hein and
individuals attacking tax benefits under Arizona Christian; if Flast goes it
will be the situation for all taxing and spending measures that funnel finan-
cial benefits to religious groups or uses.
Similarly, the Court's reliance in Arizona Christian on taxpayer stand-
ing decisions outside the Establishment Clause context, and particularly
their separation of powers rationale, says something substantive about es-
86. Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1055-56, 1072-73.
87. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
88. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445-47 (2011).
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tablishment. 89 There is a "positive pregnant" in the Court's claim that it is
not the business of the courts to adjudicate complaints about religious tax-
ing and spending. The positive implication in that negative claim is that
religious taxing and spending is the business (and exclusively so) of the
political branches. 90 By disclaiming judicial authority, the Court is rein-
forcing legislative and executive authority. Indeed, the Court is making that
authority nearly exclusive by making it virtually unreviewable. It is, in
effect, delegating the task of constitutional interpretation regarding the
constitutional limits on state financial support for religion to the political
branches, and hence to the dictates of majority rule. Taxing and spending
for purposes of supporting religion becomes effectively a kind of "political
question" where the applicable standards and outcomes are entrusted to the
legislative and/or executive branches of government. 91
In this regard it is important to remember the categorical nature of the
Court's incipient no-taxpayer-standing rule. In other contexts, when one
challenger is denied standing, there is usually some other kind of challeng-
er who can step forward to adjudicate the claim. Not here. Consider, for
example, the tax credits involved in Arizona Christian. If Arizona taxpay-
ers cannot challenge them, who can? Beyond the taxpayers who receive the
credit and the schools that benefit from them (all of whom experience ben-
efit rather than injury and have no motive to challenge the law), the only
parties immediately affected are those who must pay the taxes that offset
the lost revenues resulting from the credits. But they are all in the same
category as the challengers in Arizona Christian, meaning that the rule
against taxpayer standing cuts off all their claims. 92
Is there anyone else? The only other options I can think of are legisla-
tors who voted against the tax breaks in the belief they were illegal, and/or
others who lobbied for similar tax breaks for other activities but didn't get
them. But of course, legislative standing is nearly as frowned upon as tax-
89. Particularly noteworthy in this context is the Court's heavy reliance on DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006), which rejected taxpayer standing in a strictly economic setting. In doing
so, the Court effectively ignored the possibility of psychic harm resulting from governmental financial
support for religious schools through its tax credit system.
90. Arizona Christian's anti-taxpayer-standing rule functions in this regard in much the same way
as the "political question" doctrine: as a determination that a question has been given over to another
branch of government. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (treating political question doctrine as
applicable where there is "a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department").
9 1. Id.
92. In her dissent, Justice Kagan suggested that some school children and their parents might
potentially have standing to challenge Arizona's tax credit scheme, but she did not elaborate on how
their claims might arise. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 n.7.
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payer standing, 93 and the injury of other would-be tax-credit-beneficiaries
is far too speculative to survive even a casual application of the Court's
traditional three-step standing "test." 94 Even if their inability to secure
comparable tax benefits qualified as an injury, it is hard to see how it was
caused by the grant of tax benefits to private-school donors, and the injury
is almost certainly incapable of judicial redress, since prohibiting one form
of tax credit won't trigger the creation of another.
So the outcome (as it was for property transfers after Valley Forge and
most likely will be for faith-based grant preferences after Hein) is that in
many instances no one can sue. As commentators on the political question
doctrine have observed, when a jurisdictional ruling amounts to a conclu-
sion that no one can sue, it also amounts to a substantive conclusion that
courts have no power to rule on the question.95 And when courts cannot
rule on a question of constitutional law, their incapacity effectively dele-
gates final authority to interpret the provision in question (at least in that
context) to one or both of the other branches of government. In Hein and
Valley Forge, the authority went to the federal executive. In Arizona Chris-
tian, it goes to the state legislature-except, as I noted above, to the extent
that state courts are willing to step in.
This substantive ramification arguably tells us a great deal about the
direction of the Court's future doctrinal thinking. If spending in support of
religion is just like spending in support of, say, the automotive industry,
and if no greater or more constitutionally significant injury happens when
one occurs than when the other, then religious spending is just another
feature of the pork-barreled, lobbying-dominated world of earmarked
spending and targeted tax breaks. Like every other would-be special inter-
est beneficiary of government and largesse, religion needs to roll up its
sleeves, roll out it grass-roots, and hire influence-peddling agents to get
what it wants and needs from government. As is always the case in that
process, there will be winners and losers. Some religions will be more suc-
cessful than others, and some may fail entirely in their appeals for govern-
ment help. But as far as the courts are concerned, so be it. As Justice Scalia
93. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821-28 (1997).
94. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1986) (requiring "injury in fact" that is "traceable" to (or
caused by) defendant's conduct and "redress[able]" by the courts).
95. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849, 853 (1994); Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question, " 79 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1985).
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implied in a partly related context in Employment Division v. Smith, that's
just the way the democratic cookie crumbles. 96
CONCLUSION
Whether the imminent elimination of taxpayer standing in establish-
ment matters is a good or bad development depends very much on what
future direction one thinks law on the Establishment Clause should take. If
one believes that financial arrangements between church and state are gen-
erally permissible, and that the democratically elected majorities in Con-
gress and state legislatures can be trusted to set for themselves appropriate
limits on how, when, and to what degree to lend government financial sup-
port to religious activities and services, then a rule which denies taxpayers
standing to challenge those arrangements on First Amendment grounds
seems unobjectionable. All it does is avoid unnecessary and inappropriate
judicial meddling with what ought to be, from this perspective, legitimate
grist for the legislative mill.
On the other hand, if one believes that the Establishment Clause was
meant to prohibit most forms of government financial support for religion,
and that government financial support for religiously affiliated services and
activities should be closely monitored for constitutionality by the courts,
then a rule against taxpayer standing impairs the capacity of the judiciary to
perform its proper constitutional function and leaves the political branches
free to disregard the First Amendment's command at will. Without taxpay-
er standing, there is a substantial risk that unconstitutional government
measures to subsidize preferred religious groups or activities will effective-
ly evade meaningful judicial review.97
In a similar vein, if one believes that the Establishment Clause is pri-
marily about limits on regulatory power and/or symbolism, but that it has
little if anything to say about formally neutral but functionally preferential
systems of financial aid to religion, then a no-taxpayer-standing rule only
cuts off claims that are of no particular constitutional moment. Conversely,
if one believes that functional and formal government benefits for religion
are of equal importance in striking the proper constitutional relationship
96. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs.").
97. As I have expressed elsewhere, this is my personal view. See Rahdert, supra note 12, at 1014




between church and state, then a no-taxpayer-standing rule risks a doctrinal
imbalance in which the formalities of government-church interaction are
judicially supervised but underlying functional financial interactions escape
judicial cognizance.
Reading the tea leaves of jurisdiction, then, gives us a glimpse into
what may be the impending doctrinal shift on the Supreme Court. If the
Court overrules Flast, its action will send a strong signal that the Court
intends to set functional financial government support for religion largely
free from judicial oversight, and to concentrate its efforts instead on more
formal regulatory, symbolic, or programmatic church-state interactions. As
a consequence, the new doctrine under development on the Court is likely
to be relatively unconcerned with "primary effect" or "entanglement," be-
cause these inquiries look at functional outcomes rather than formal inputs.
Instead, the Court's new doctrine is more likely to be concerned with mat-
ters like "religious purpose," "coercion," and perhaps some forms of "en-
dorsement," because these inquiries potentially concern formal government
actions for which religious difference and psychic harm still evidently mat-
ter. But in these areas what will matter most is whether the government is
aiming by its actions to secure religious advantage for some faith or group
of faiths. Outright government promotion of a religious message or activity
because of its religious content may still be prohibited, but use of religious
means to accomplish either non-religious or mixed (religious and nonreli-
gious) ends will be treated much more flexibly, so long as the government
steers clear of specific, overt, and concretely demonstrable religious prefer-
ences.
If this looks like a substantial trimming of the Establishment Clause's
doctrinal shrubbery, that is because it probably is. The same judicial im-
pulses that favor what I have termed Establishment Clause "court reform"
also probably support similar paring of operating Establishment Clause
principles.98 If (as I suspect) the Court is working its way toward a new
constitutional Establishment Clause doctrine, it is likely to select, from
among the various criteria and factors that have been at play in recent case
law, a streamlined set of criteria that emphasizes only those factors that are
most closely related to the now stripped-down focus of the Court on Estab-
lishment Clause issues.
In this regard, it may well be significant that Lemon was about gov-
ernment spending to support religious education, and that the taxpayer suits
in the case were enabled by Flast. Thus the Court's Lemon test, though it
98. One might call this impulse a desire for "Establishment Clause simplification."
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gathered together criteria from earlier cases that did not involve funding,
was forged in the context of defining functional limitations on government
financial religious support. With Flast gone, and most religious funding
cases with it, the Court may be able to find new criteria that deal more di-
rectly with the other kinds of establishment issues remaining on its docket,
and that better reflect for those milieux the permissive approach that the
Court majority is presumably aiming to achieve. If this is correct, then the
elimination of taxpayer standing is not only a mechanism for finding
breathing space, but an actual prelude to emergent new Establishment
Clause thinking.

